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Dmsiox F EncE-LocATxoN By PAROL AGREEMENT on ACQuIJscENor
-In an action of ejeetment A sought to recover the possession of a
tract of land some 110 yards wide and extending across the entire north
side of a forty-acre tract of land. Evidence tended to show that the
true boundary was about 100 yards south of an old fence. However,
the parties had long acquiesced in the old fence which had been con-
sidered the true boundary. It was held that long acquiescence in the
division fence constituted a parol agreement fixing the boundary. The
court also laid down the rule that where uncertainty or dispute exists
concerning a boundary, adjoining landowners, by parol may fix the line
binding on them and grantees, although possession thereunder is less
than the statutory period. Robinson v. Gaylord, 33 S. W. (2d) 710, 182
Ark. 849 (1931).
The principal case in upholding the validity of a parol agreement
by adjoining landowners to fix a division fence sets forth the almost
unanimous view. The courts differ widely, however, on the basis of
such decisions and vary somewhat in their statements concerning the
elements which must be present to establish the validity of such agree-
ments. The majority of the courts declare that three elements must
be present: (1) Uncertainty (often meaning ambiguity in the deed)
or a bona fide dispute concerning the true line; (2) An agreement to
settle the dispute; and (3) either actual or constructive possession In
pursuance of said agreement. Jones v. Scott, 145 X. E. 378, 314 IlM.
118 (1924); Barfteld v. Birrick, 10 S. E. 43, 151 Ga. 618 (19-).
The question of the validity of parol agreements by adjoining
landowners arises in three types of cases, namely:
(1) Where the deed itself is ambiguous, the parol agreement is
for the purpose of placing a definite construction on the language of
the deed. There is thus no problem involving the Statute of Frauds or
varying a written agreement by parol evidence.
(2) Where the terms of the deed are ascertainable, but appear
uncertain to the adjoining landowners, the parties often make a parol
agreement to set up a certain boundary. The settlement is made in the
belief that the true division line has been established. The majority
of the courts properly hold that a discovery that a mistake was made
re-establishes the true line unless some element of estoppel exists.
Randleman v. Taylor, 127 S. W. 723, 94 Ark. 511 (1910); Turner FaZl
Lumber Co. v. Burns, 71 Vt. 354, 45 Atl. 896.
(3) The third situation is somewhat similar to the second. The
true construction of the deed is ascertainable, but the deed appearS
ambiguous to the adjoining landowners and in order to erect a satis-
factory boundary, the parties make mutual concessions and on the
basis of such concessions a division fence is erected. It is in this type of
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case that the questions involving the Statute of Frauds, the parol evi-
dence rule, and the position of a bona fide purchaser arise. It is to be
admitted that the solution to these problems as set forth in this note
is not clearly expressed in the various decisions. The courts speak of
"estoppel," acquiescence," "practical location," etc.
The practical solution here given, nevertheless, appears to be the
underlying, if not express, basis of the various decisions.
The question of varying a written deed by parol evidence arises
first. However, if a contract is within the Statute of Frauds and is in
writing or a proper written memorandum has at some time been made,
a subsequent oral agreement to rescind or alter the contract is effectual
if the oral agreement fulfills the requisites of a contract at common
law. (See Williston on Contracts Sections 491-592.) The consideration
for the subsequent parol agreement in the present type of division
disputes Is the giving up of the respective conflicting claims made in
the bona fide dispute. Turner v. Bowen, 180 Ky. 755, 203 S. W. 749.
The question then arises: Why is the oral agreement not within
the Statute of Frauds and thus necessary to be in writing? The naswer
lies In the requirement that markings must be made or possession be
taken by virtue of the oral agreement. The fulfillment of this require-
ment constitutes part performance which takes the agreement out of
the Statute of Frauds.
The oral agreements, resulting from a bona fide dispute, are held
binding on all parties, except a bona fide purchaser. Jones v. Scott,
145 N. 1,. 378, 314"Ill. 118 (1924). The agreements are binding even
though it is subsequently ascertained that the boundary agreed upon
is incorrect. Silva v. Azeuedo, 173 P. 929, 178 Cal. 495; Terrif v.,
Bryson, 37 S. W. (2d) 84 (1931). The oral agreement, as a practical
matter, is in most jurisdictions binding even on the bona fide purchaser
as the jurisdictions require possession under the parol agreement, and
this gives constructive notice of the agreement Some jurisdictions
go so far as to hold that constructive possession, as a mere blazing of
trees along the agreed line, is sufficient.
Acquiescence for a long period in a division fence raises problems
similar to the parol agreement difficulties. In fact, it is often declared
that such acquiescence may amount to a parol agreement. Robison v.
Gaylor, 33 S. W. (2d) 710, 182 Ark. 849. There are two main reasons
given for such a holding: (1) Some courts hold that recognition of
or "acquiescence" in a certain line for a long time is conclusive of an
agreement. (2) Other courts regard it as an independent rule of law,
dictated by general consideration of justice and expediency, in order
that uncertainty and disturbance of boundaries be avoided. See Tiffany
Real Property, Vol. 1, page 999.
The courts vary as to the time necessary for such acquiescence to
amount to a parol agreement. A few cases hold that the acquiescence
may be conclusive, although it has not been for the full statutory
period. 'Wood v. Bepp, 169 N. W. 518, 41 S. D. 195 (1918); Keen v.
Osborne, 215 S. W. 798, 185 Ky. 647 (1919). The majority of the courts
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more properly declare that acquiescence raises the presumption that
the boundary is correct, but only after the full statutory period has
passed does the presumption become conclusive.
Kentucky takes a peculiar and apparently indefensible position in
regard to the question under consideration. The courts declare: "The
parties do not undertake to acquire or transfer land, but merely to
make certain that which they regard1 as uncertain." Turner v. Bowens,
203 S. W. 749, 180 Ky.'755 (1918); Keen v. Osborne, 215 S. W. 798, 185
Ky. 647 (1919). in short, the courts say that the parties merely give
a definite construction to the language of the deed, and take under
the written deed. However, if the taking is under such deed (an im-
possibility in those cases in which the language is not ambiguous and
the true construction is thus ascertainable), the parol agreement is
alone sufficient. The courts nevertheless uniformly declare that for
such parol agreement to be valid, there must be a bona fide dispute
and possession taken under such dispute.
It is to be admitted that other states make the same error in this
regard. However, the solution, as given supra, that a bona fide dispute
plus the possession eliminates the question of the Statute of Frauds
and appears the practical and the underlying, though unexpressed,
basis of the decisions. In Kentucky there should be no such solution
as Kentucky courts do not recognize part performance as taking parol
agreements out of the Statute of Frauds in other situations.
The reason for the failure to take note of the lack of logic of her
position is not apparent in the decisions. Perhaps, the expldnation
is the practicability of the holding and thus the practicability of over-
looking logical defects. Mississippi courts, likewise barring part per-
formance as taking parol agreements out of the Statute of Frauds, ex-
plain their decisions as follows: "An early decision was posslbly due
to an erroneous impression that their allowance is really a judicially
created exception to the Statute of Frauds; neverthless the decision is
still binding on this court." Archer v. HeZm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 So. 3.
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TORTS-DUTY OP STOREKEEPER TO PROVIDE A SAFE PLACE FOR
CusToMERS.--Plaintiff, on entering defendant's store, slipped and fell,
injuring herself. The floor of the store had been oiled. In an action
for damages for personal injury she was allowed to recover. On appeal
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The
court in discussing the duty of the storekeeper said, "Appellant had
a right to oil the floor of its store. It was not an insurer of appellee's
safety while using its floor. But, it was its duty, after oiling it, to use
ordinary care, that is, that degree of care usually exercised by an
ordinarily prudent person engaged in the same line of business, to
maintain its floor in a reasonably sate condition for the use of its
customers while using it when making their purchases of its goods."
Eroger Grocery and Baking Co. v. Monrle, 34 S. W. (2nd) 929 (1931).
This seems to be the rule, both in Kentucky and generally as to
